CVE-2026-25560 CVE-2026-1962 CVE-2026-1963 CVE-2026-2206 CVE-2026-25859 CVE-2026-25564 CVE-2026-1892 CVE-2026-1894 CVE-2026-1895 CVE-2026-1896 CVE-2026-1897 CVE-2026-1898 CVE-2026-1964 CVE-2026-2205 C Exploit & Vulnerability Analysis

1. Vulnerability Background

This analysis covers a group of related security fixes in a Meteor-based board management application. The patch addresses multiple issues in the following areas:

• client/components/settings/translationBody.js
• models/cardComments.js
• public/api/wekan.yml
• models/lists.js

Exact CVE descriptions were unavailable due to a retrieval error, so the assessment is based on the patched code diff.

What is this vulnerability?

• The patch resolves several authorization and access control flaws:
  • insecure direct database modification from client-side code,
  • improper authentication and user impersonation via user-controlled request payload,
  • API parameter tampering exposing identity assignment,
  • broken access control by using a read-level check for write operations.

Why is it critical/important?

• These flaws allow attackers to bypass intended server-side authorization controls.
• They can lead to:
  • unauthorized deletion of translation entries,
  • creation of comments attributed to arbitrary users,
  • modification of board lists without proper write privileges.
• Such issues undermine data integrity, auditability, and application trust boundaries.

What systems/versions are affected?

• The affected code is in the Wekan application stack (Meteor + Node.js).
• The exact version range is not provided, but the patched files indicate that any deployed version containing the pre-fix code in the listed files is affected.

2. Technical Details

Root cause analysis

• client/components/settings/translationBody.js

  • The client code invoked Translation.remove(this.translationId) directly.
  • This bypasses server-side validation and relies on insecure direct collection modification from the client.

• models/cardComments.js

  • The server handler trusted req.body.authorId when creating comments.
  • commentCreation(req.body.authorId, cardComment) allowed a client to specify the comment author.
  • This is a classic user impersonation flaw caused by trusting client-controlled identity input.

• public/api/wekan.yml

  • The Swagger/OpenAPI definition exposed authorId as a required form parameter for comment creation.
  • This documented and encouraged an insecure API contract where clients could submit arbitrary author identifiers.

• models/lists.js

  • List modification code used Authentication.checkBoardAccess(req.userId, paramBoardId).
  • checkBoardAccess appears to be a read-level or generic access check.
  • Write operations require Authentication.checkBoardWriteAccess(req.userId, paramBoardId).
  • This is an authorization logic error that allows insufficiently privileged users to perform list writes.

Attack vector and exploitation conditions

• Translation deletion:

  • Any authenticated client with access to the translation UI or collection API may execute a direct remove operation.
  • If the client-side collection is writable, arbitrary translation documents can be deleted.

• Comment impersonation:

  • An authenticated user can submit a comment creation request with authorId set to another user’s ID.
  • The application then attributes the comment to the supplied identity rather than the actual caller.

• API parameter tampering:

  • The OpenAPI spec exposed an insecure parameter, making it easier for attackers and automated tools to craft malicious requests.
  • Even if the server implementation is fixed, outdated specs may continue to guide clients into insecure behavior.

• List write access bypass:

  • Any user with board access but without explicit write permission may invoke list create/update/delete endpoints.
  • The bug is in authorization enforcement, not in authentication.

Security implications

• Unauthorized data modification.
• User impersonation and audit log corruption.
• Privilege escalation from read access to write capability.
• Potential wider impact if list modification affects board structure, card organization, or workflow.

3. Patch Analysis

What code changes were made?

• client/components/settings/translationBody.js
  • Old: Translation.remove(this.translationId);
  • New: Meteor.call('deleteTranslation', this.translationId);
• models/cardComments.js
  • Old: userId: req.body.authorId,
  • New: userId: req.userId,
  • Old: commentCreation(req.body.authorId, cardComment);
  • New: commentCreation(req.userId, cardComment);
• public/api/wekan.yml
  • Old parameter: authorId in formData, required, user who posted comment.
  • New parameter: comment only.
• models/lists.js
  • Old: Authentication.checkBoardAccess(req.userId, paramBoardId);
  • New: Authentication.checkBoardWriteAccess(req.userId, paramBoardId);
  • This change appears in multiple list-related handlers.

How do these changes fix the vulnerability?

• Client-side direct deletion is removed in favor of a server-side method, restoring centralized authorization and preventing arbitrary client-issued deletes.
• Comment creation now uses the authenticated requestor’s req.userId instead of a client-supplied author field, eliminating impersonation.
• The API specification no longer advertises an insecure author override parameter, reducing the attack surface and aligning client expectations with server logic.
• Replacing generic/read-level access checks with explicit write permission validation closes the privilege escalation path for list operations.

Security improvements introduced

• Enforcement of server-side authorization for destructive operations.
• Elimination of trust in client-controlled identity parameters.
• Clear separation between read and write access control.
• Improved API contract hygiene in documentation/specification.

4. Proof of Concept (PoC) Guide

This section describes how an attacker could verify and exploit the pre-patch behavior.

Prerequisites for exploitation

• Access to an authenticated Wekan account.
• Ability to interact with the application API or browser console.
• Knowledge of target IDs (translationId, userId, board/list IDs) as needed.

Step-by-step exploitation approach

1. Translation deletion

• Precondition: application exposes the Translation collection to the client with write permission.
• In browser console:
  • Translation.remove('<targetTranslationId>');
• Expected behavior after patch:
  • The client-call fails or is rejected, and deletion must be performed through Meteor.call('deleteTranslation', ...).
• Exploited behavior before patch:
  • The translation document is removed from the database immediately.

2. Comment impersonation

• Precondition: comment creation endpoint accepts authorId.
• Craft an HTTP request:
  • POST /api/cards/<cardId>/comments
  • Form data includes comment=<text> and authorId=<otherUserId>
• Expected behavior after patch:
  • The comment is created with the authenticated caller’s userId, not the supplied authorId.
• Exploited behavior before patch:
  • The comment is created under <otherUserId>, impersonating that user.

3. List write access bypass

• Precondition: tester has board read access but not write access.
• Send a list modification request to the relevant endpoint, e.g. create or move a list.
• Expected behavior after patch:
  • Request fails with authorization error due to checkBoardWriteAccess.
• Exploited behavior before patch:
  • Request succeeds because only generic board access was validated.

4. API specification tampering

• Verify the OpenAPI/Swagger spec no longer contains authorId for the comment endpoint.
• If the spec still exposes it, malicious tools can continue to abuse the insecure contract.

How to verify the vulnerability exists

• Review the application source for direct client-side collection operations.
• Confirm comment endpoints use req.body.authorId instead of authenticated identity.
• Confirm API docs/specs expose user identity fields for client submission.
• Confirm list endpoints call checkBoardAccess rather than checkBoardWriteAccess before write operations.
• Use a test account with minimal privileges to execute the above PoC steps and observe whether unauthorized actions are permitted.

5. Recommendations

Mitigation strategies

• Apply the patch that replaces client-side removals with server-side methods and strengthens authorization checks.
• Remove or secure any remaining client-side direct collection mutation code.
• Audit request handlers for client-controlled identity fields and replace them with server-side authenticated identifiers.

Detection methods

• Code review for:
  • Collection.remove / Collection.update / Collection.insert calls in client code.
  • use of req.body.userId / authorId / similar fields to assign userId values.
  • authorization checks that do not distinguish read from write access.
• Runtime monitoring for:
  • comments created with unexpected author IDs.
  • list modifications by users with only read permissions.
  • direct client-originated deletions.

Best practices to prevent similar issues

• Do not trust client input for authorization-sensitive fields.
• Enforce all destructive operations through server-side methods or secure endpoints.
• Keep API documentation tightly synchronized with actual authorization behavior.
• Use explicit privilege checks for write operations (checkBoardWriteAccess, checkProjectWriteAccess, etc.), not generic read access checks.
• Adopt a principle of least privilege for both API consumers and client-side data exposure.